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Why Quantitative Structuring?∗
Andrei N. Soklakov†
Quality-designed products are easy to recognize. Wouldn’t it be great if the
quality of financial products became just as apparent?
This paper is addressed to financial practitioners. It provides an informal
introduction to Quantitative Structuring – a technology of manufacturing
quality financial products.
The presentation is arranged in three parts: the main text assumes no prior
knowledge of the topic; important detailed discussions are arranged as a set
of appendices; finally, a list of references provides further details including
applications beyond product design: from model risk to economics.
∗Original version 25 July 2015, this presentation 31 May 2017.
†Head of Strategic Development, Asia-Pacific Equities, Deutsche Bank.
The views expressed herein should not be considered as investment advice or promotion. They represent
personal research of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of his employers, or their associates
or affiliates. Andrei.Soklakov@(db.com, gmail.com).
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1 Motivation
We believe that products are very important for any business. Products pay our salaries
and define our relationships with clients. A business without a product is a business in
trouble. Successful products open many doors – anything from business expansion to the
support of charitable causes becomes possible. Products are quite simply the ultimate
source of our risks and rewards.
We believe that every effort must be made to improve financial products. Almost every
other industry has seen dramatic improvements in product design. The financial industry
cannot afford staying behind.
We believe that the future of finance lies in adopting a more scientific approach to product
design. We note that the numerous successful applications of science in other industries
became possible only because science itself reached the necessary level of clarity. To
achieve similar results in finance, we should be prepared to upgrade the scientific standing
of finance.
We expect many challenges along the way. It will help us to remember that there were
tough times in the history of every single branch of science. During such times problems
appear to be special, even beyond the realm of logic. Moral dilemmas, regulatory pressures
and the need to persuade the public dominate the agenda. Somehow, these are also
the times when progress is made. Right now is probably the best time ever to discuss
improvements in financial products.
2 Guiding principle
Quality research is hard. To achieve it we have to fight our own prejudice and numerous
subconscious biases. This is what science is really all about. Science is not confined to
any particular subject, it happens whenever there is a genuine and honest attempt to
understand something.
We want to understand “good” financial products. Clearly, not every financial product is
“good”. There must be properties, fundamental laws if you will, which “good” financial
products must satisfy. But how do we look for these fundamental laws? How do we
even know if we have found one? This is an extremely hard question. We need some
inspiration, and there is no better place for finding that than in the real success stories of
science.
Let us pick some well-understood scientific theories which are as different from each other
as possible. Newtonian Mechanics and Darwinian Evolution are good examples. What
do these theories have in common? What makes them useful? Why do we teach these
theories to our children despite well known factual contradictions?
Both theories contain a powerful observation, a paradigm which greatly simplifies and
facilitates understanding. For example, the famous Newton’s law, F = ma, is just a
definition of a quantity which Newton decided to call “force”. Mathematically speaking,
it is a triviality. So, where is the breakthrough, where is the insight? – we might ask. The
insight lies in the fact that thinking in terms of forces greatly simplifies our understanding
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of many physical phenomena. So much so, that the greatest achievements of Newton are
now accessible to school children. Similarly, Darwin’s observation of natural selection
gives us a thinking paradigm, a concept. This concept is not even quantitative, but it
makes the living world much easier to understand.
So, this is what we need to find – a concept which makes financial products easier to
understand.
[ If we were to jump ahead of this presentation and reveal what we think this concept is
we would say that good financial products are always based on research, and the optimal
products are most easily understood as likelihood functions describing this research. ]
3 Financial products
What exactly are financial products? Browsing through termsheets we quickly discover
that each and every product is really just a function, F (x), which states how benefits
(normally cashflows) depend on the underlying variables, x (which may include time,
market prices, credit ratings, weather readings or actions of other people – anything that
is relevant for a given product). In the following we refer to F (x) as a payoff function.
Now we know what our theory has to produce – payoff functions.
The landscape of all financial products is huge. We need a good place to start the
exploration. In Appendix 6.1 we consider all possibilities and conclude that investment
products provide a very good starting point.
3.1 Investment products
Investment structuring is an old problem. Even Modern Portfolio Theory is now over 60
years old. Nevertheless, the quality of investment products still has room for improvement.
Analysis which leads to this conclusion is presented in Appendix 6.2. Here we focus on
the constructive elements and ask ourselves what minimal features we want to see in a
good investment product.
We demand that each investment product has a well-defined purpose, accurately expresses
clients’ views and has logical integrity. These three requirements are not independent.
Let us examine them as we would examine the facets of a crystal when looking for the
most promising direction of study.
① Purpose
Each investment product must have a goal. Mathematically, this is formulated as an
optimization problem. Although routinely violated in practice (see Appendix 6.2), this
requirement is very well established in finance and economics. The best known exam-
ple is probably the Markowitz optimal portfolio which is constructed as a solution to a
particular mean-variance optimization problem. Expected utility theory provides a more
general framework for rational investors. Even clients who choose to depart from rational-
ity have some means of describing their goals – the optimization setup of prospect theory1.
1The relationship between our approach and Behavioral Finance is outlined in Appendix 6.4.
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② Accurately expressed views
Investors may agree with the market, but most often they do not. Investors search for
undervalued or overvalued opportunities and bring this new information to the market. It
is very important for both the investor and wider society that the results of their research
are expressed accurately. This means that investment products must be able to reflect
subtle differences in investors’ views. Investors should be able to combine views and
there should be no implicit extrapolation of views beyond the researched scope. Further
clarifications of these requirements can be found in Appendix 6.2.
③ Logical integrity
Information processing is a big part of investment activity. Information processing obeys
laws commonly known as logic. Even before we explore what the logical integrity of an
investment looks like we know that such integrity must be important.
The first of the above requirements has been extensively explored within the field of
economics. The second requirement is obvious in that it should follow from any reasonable
approach to investment. The third requirement is relatively new and it requires major
clarification. In the next section we explain what we mean by logical integrity via its
implementation. Because logic is the backbone of any branch of science, we hope that
this relatively new line of enquiry will give us a glimpse of our ultimate dream – finance
as a scientific discipline.
4 Logic of learning and payoffs as likelihoods
Let x be some underlying variable (as introduced above in section 3). In the presence of
uncertainty, our knowledge about x is described by a probability distribution p(x). Upon
learning new data, d, knowledge p(x) should be updated to p(x|d). The logic behind this
update is well known in probability theory as the Bayes’ theorem. This reads
p(x|d) = Ld(x) p(x) , (1)
where Ld(x) is called the likelihood function. As we can see from the above equation
the likelihood function encapsulates everything we need to know in order to update our
knowledge about x on the account of learning d.
Imagine an investor for whom we can reconstruct the entire logical path. This means that
we know the starting distribution p(x) assumed by the investor and all the subsequent
learning steps of the form (1) which lead to the final knowledge
p(x|d1, d2, ..., dn) = Ldn(x) · · · · · Ld2(x)Ld1(x) p(x) . (2)
It is important that the starting distribution, p(x), also known as the prior, is built by
the investor using publicly available (market) information and that the data d1, d2, ..., dn
(which may include assumptions as well as established facts) come in addition to this
prior knowledge. In [7] we proposed to call such investors logical.
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The concept of a likelihood function is key in describing logical investors. Earlier we noted
that financial products are also defined by functions – the payoff functions. We see that
within any sensible investment theory the two concepts – the likelihood and the payoff
functions – must be connected.
Historically, we have not had much science about payoff functions. Typically, the struc-
ture of financial derivatives has been either postulated or assumed as given – suggested
spontaneously by wise markets. By contrast, the concept of a likelihood function is ex-
tremely well known across all kinds of scientific applications: probability and statistics,
computer science and artificial intelligence, physics and engineering, biology and medicine
– to name just a few.
It should come as no surprise that thinking in terms of likelihood functions greatly sim-
plifies the understanding and structuring of investment products. Mathematically, this
manifests in the form of very simple intuitive equations for payoff functions (see Ap-
pendix 6.3).
5 Results so far
5.1 Theory
The main technical result is a pair of very simple equations (see Appendix 6.3). These
equations allow us to design products which satisfy all of the requirements discussed in
this paper. In particular, going through the key requirements from section 3.1, we find:
①: Each of our products has a well-defined goal. If required, this goal can be written
as an optimization problem in the notation of the expected utility theory.
For the first time, we can design a financial derivative and claim it to be “the best
product” not just because it is a good marketing move but because it is true (in a
very well-defined mathematical and economic sense).
②: All of our products accurately express clients’ views. The views of the client (or
their research advisor) are included in a transparent way as inputs of our equations.
The equations are very simple so they can also be used in reverse: to show the views
expressed by the clients’ current positions; or the views that the client would be
expressing if they went for any particular product [4]. This supports a meaningful
and constructive conversation with the client making sure that they do end up
expressing the views that they actually have.
③: The logical integrity of new products is ensured by the connection of the payoff
functions with the likelihood functions. This connection is woven in the derivation
of the equations [4, 7] and is the reason for their simplicity and intuitive convenience.
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5.2 Practice
With all their shortcomings, financial products of the past have given us a tremendous
amount of experience. We respect this knowledge and want to retain as much of it as
possible. To this end we require our theory to have the ability to analyze traditional
products even though it may expose them as deficient in some way. In [5] we check this
requirement by looking at some traditional products. We start with vanilla instruments
(spot, vol, skew products) moving into more exotic path-dependent skew products. We
also reproduce key design ideas of bespoke equity indices and discuss the early exercise
feature. As expected, we find that traditional products use hidden assumptions which
often make some sense but in general may not be easy to justify.
In the same paper [5] we noticed that product and model design form related disciplines.
Indeed, modeling deficiencies can be exploited as investment opportunities. We develop
this idea further in [6] where we present an economically meaningful approach to model
risk assessment.
In Ref [7] we focused our attention on risk aversion. This very important topic arises in
practice every time we try to be conservative or stay on the safer side of some investment
strategy. Using our equations we found that the standard ad-hoc methods of engineering
risk aversion (such as expressing a more conservative view or modifying payoffs) do not
normally achieve their goal. Instead, investments can very easily turn into a gamble.
Being conservative turns out to be a delicate task and our equations provide the tools for
accomplishing this task.
In Ref [8] we touch on the subject of long-term investments. We challenge our theory
by considering the equity premium puzzle which has been defying mainstream economics
for the last 30 years. In the long run, riskier assets (such as equity) tend to produce
higher returns than the less risky ones (such as bonds). What is puzzling is the numerical
magnitude of the effect: the standard economic theory predicts a much smaller effect
(an order of magnitude smaller) than observed in the market. Resolving the puzzle is
considered important because of its relevance to socially important long-term investments
such as pensions. With just a few lines of mathematics our theory predicts a correct
ballpark figure for the equity premium and suggests a modification of the standard theory
of economics. In the context of the scientific method this result is especially important
because it confirms the validity of our approach against real data.
6 Appendix: FAQs and discussions
6.1 Why so much focus on investments?
Let us ask ourselves a more fundamental question: Why do we have customers? People
come to us with different stories but all of them point to three fundamental reasons: in-
vestment, raising capital and hedging. On top of these we must remember requirements
from wider society, which are often summarized as providing efficient allocation of re-
sources wherever they are needed.
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Thinking through the above reasons and requirements, we see that investment products
are taking a lead role. Indeed, investment and raising capital are really two sides of the
same coin: a customer who is trying to raise capital is looking for investors and must
therefore present them with an investable opportunity.
Even when we discuss solutions to social issues we talk about investments: in schools,
in hospitals, in local communities. The benefits of such investments may be difficult to
capture mathematically, but there is no doubt – efficient allocation of resources is an
investment-type problem.
Worried about older people? Well, pensions are examples of long-term investments. In
fact, any kind of serious economic planning needs good quality investment behavior, for
it is the prime supplier of accurate market information.
Right now our trust in investment products is at an all time low. Regulation is pouring
over investment banks like concrete over leaking nuclear reactors. At the same time we
understand that outlawing investment products is not an option: in addition to all of the
above reasons, this will encourage speculation in products which have never been designed
as investment vehicles: debt insurance and other hedging instruments. Improving the
design of investment products appears to be an urgent priority.
6.2 Legacy investment products – what are the issues?
Most people would agree that our investment banks needs serious improvement. However,
it is always a good exercise to identify issues as precisely as possible. In this section we
summarize our argument for reform of investment products.
We start by looking at the most basic promise of each and every investment product – the
promise to express accurately investors’ views relative to the market. Let us examine the
quality of this promise. The following points summarize three types of problems which
we regard as critical.
View differentiation
Consider two investors with views similar in direction but very different in strength.
Imagine a market of options with a well pronounced skew. One investor believes that the
skew should be a bit less pronounced than the market-implied while the other thinks that
there should be no skew at all. The difference in views is significant, but because both
investors agree on the direction, currently they would be offered the same set of products.
View integration
Consider an investor with a view on both the volatility and the skew. Say he believes that
the skew should disappear and the volatility will realize 5 vol points below the current
market expectation. How should the investor allocate his money? Should he put most of
it on the volatility or on the skew? Are we even sure that the investor is better off with
two separate trades (one on the vol and the other on the skew), or is there a structured
product which is better optimized to express the combined view? Structurers are currently
not equipped to tackle these types of questions.
The above two problems are already pretty bad. We cannot differentiate or combine
customer views! An equivalent situation in mathematics or science would be like having
a number theory which does not tell us how to add numbers or a physical theory which
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cannot capture the relative strength of forces. Surely, the situation cannot get any worse
than this. The following observation says that it actually does.
View extrapolation
Investment products often extrapolate customer views beyond their original research con-
text. Even if the expressed view makes sense in a limited region (e.g. near ATM), the
extrapolated view often has no bounds. Indeed, quite a few investment products (includ-
ing standardized derivatives) offer theoretically unlimited gains or can lead to theoretically
unlimited losses – all mostly in the circumstances which are very difficult to research (no
market information, low-probability scenarios, etc.). Such extrapolation of views can lead
to systemic accumulation of completely unnecessary risks which are often in the tails.
It would be good if in addition to the above, we could also give specific examples pointing
to the flaws of real-life products. The presentations by Merton [2] and Dupire [1] are good
independent examples of such analysis for simple and complex derivatives respectively.
However, as soon as we start thinking about such examples we quickly realize that no
finite number of them is ever sufficient – just like debunking one perpetual motion machine
after another does not stop all attempts to invent new ones. How could we show that
investment products contain more than a few rotten apples, that huge classes of them
are fundamentally flawed? There is only one way of doing that – we need a method, an
ability to create any number of realistic examples on demand. Here is one such method...
The first thing we need to acknowledge is that any investment is an optimization. This is
in fact true in a much wider range of situations – pretty much anything that we “want”
anything that has a “goal” can be viewed as an optimization. The language of maximizing
returns, minimizing risks and constraining losses is the language of optimization which
investors use naturally to describe their goals.
To make it as fair as possible, let us use some examples from readers’ personal experience.
So please sit back, relax, and remember as many investment products as you can. Barrier
options, lookback structures, mountain ranges, cliquets – the whole lot. Take as much
time as you like. And as you are recalling them, choose you favorite product. Make sure
you are really comfortable with your choice. Imagine all of the features of this product.
Remember all the clever ideas behind these individual features. Now could you please
explain: what optimization problem does it solve? I don’t know which product you have
chosen but I am pretty sure that you are now struggling with this question. Some people
are trying to talk about bears and bulls, but let us remain focused: What optimization
problem does it solve? Animal spirits are not helping. The more you think about it
the more you realize that, strictly speaking, the product was never designed to solve any
particular problem. In fact, nobody even bothered to state the problem.
This could not possibly be good – neither for the client nor for wider society. There are
of course exceptions to the above argument, but we all know that the vast majority of
investment products would not stand up to this very simple examination.
The good news is that all of the specific issues discussed in this section are resolved by
Quantitative Structuring (see the main text).
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6.3 Structuring equations
In Ref. [7] we discovered that for a large class of logical investors, the logical path (2) can
be viewed as a simple two-step learning process: one step incorporating market research
and the other learning investors’ private information (risk aversion). The two learning
steps gave us two equations which, by way of introduction, we summarize here as
b = f m (3)
d lnF
d ln f
=
1
R
. (4)
One way of explaining these equations is to note that they are obeyed by a payoff function
F (x) which solves the following optimization problem
max
F
∫
b(x)U(F (x)) dx subject to budget constraint
∫
F (x)m(x) dx = 1 . (5)
Risk aversion coefficient R is connected to the utility U through the standard Arrow-Pratt
formula: R = −FU ′′
FF
/U ′
F
. The economic meaning of the market-implied and investor-
believed distributions m(x) and b(x) is explained by the above optimization problem.
Connection between our equations and the optimization (5) shows that all our investment
products have a well-defined economic goal which is consistent with the expected utility
theory. The first requirement of section 3.1 is satisfied.
There is of course more to our equations than their connection to optimization problem (5).
Coming back to the structure of logical paths (2), we note that equivalent conclusions
can be reached via many different logical paths. Consequently, there are many equivalent
forms our equations can take. These forms differ in the intermediate payoff functions,
such as the function f(x) which is typically found from Eq. (3) and then used to obtain
the final payoff function F by integrating Eq. (4).
The intermediate function f(x) in our equations has the meaning of the optimal payoff
function of the growth-optimizing investor – the investor which aims for the greatest
expected rate of return. For such investor R = 1, Eq. (4) becomes redundant and we are
only left with Eq. (3).
Looking closely at Eq. (3) we see that it has an easily-recognizable Bayesian structure (1)
with the payoff f playing the role of the likelihood function [4]. For the growth-optimizing
investor the connection between payoff and likelihood functions takes its simplest form –
they simply coincide. Thinking in terms of likelihood functions is in many ways equivalent
to thinking in terms of growth-optimizing investors.
First introduced by Bernoulli over 270 years ago, the concept of a growth-optimizing
investor is widely researched and used. Economists use it every time they mention log
utility, the hedge fund community know it under the name of Kelly strategy. Promoted
by some and criticized by others, growth-optimizing strategy left very few researchers
without a strong opinion on it. This includes legendary fund managers as well as Nobel
prize economists. Paul Samuelson left us with a unique illustration of how far people are
prepared to go to specify their own position relative to the growth-optimizing strategy.
Samuelson decided to address his audience with a paper which was painstakingly edited
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to consist of exclusively monosyllabic words [3]. Our morally fragile industry finally had
a leader which was prepared to insult his own audience on an almost poetic level (not to
mention the epic sacrifice of clarity in such a presentation).
With the huge benefit of hindsight and with deepest respect to our pioneers, we note that
the heated debates of the past missed a very important point. The readiness with which
people position themselves relative to the growth-optimizing investor and the strength of
their opinions makes the growth-optimizing investor a very good benchmark of investment
behavior – a very convenient intermediate step. Likelihood-based thinking exposes this
fact, benefits from it and provides striking conceptual and technical simplicity (just think
of understanding and solving Eqs. (3) and (4)).
6.4 Behavioral Finance
One of the frequently asked questions on Quantitative Structuring is how our approach
(which is rational by construction) can coexist with the findings of Behavioral Finance.
This is a very interesting question. In fact this is much more than just a question – this
is an opening to a very important debate about how we deal with the imperfections of
human judgement. On the one hand we must be aware and respectful of such limitations
(they are real measurable psychological phenomena), and on the other hand we must help
people to overcome their limitations.
The best way of clarifying our current position in this debate is to give an example.
Imagine a questionnaire on an established technical subject. To be specific, let us consider
a test in geometry. Imagine that a wide representative set of people participated in this
test. What results are we going to see and what conclusions should we make from that?
Pretty clearly, we are going to see people making mistakes. There will be patterns in our
data – some mistakes will be more frequent than others. Some of the mistakes may be
very robust and even traceable to various behavioral and cognitive tendencies (just think
of optical illusions). The knowledge of this can be very important: humans constantly
interpret geometrical configurations (such as judging distances) in the context of their
behavior (such as driving a car).
So what shall we do about this rich database of mistakes? Shall we elevate them to
the rank of fundamental laws of nature and replace mathematical fact with “behavioral
geometry”? No. Of course not. What we should do is build tools that help people to
overcome their limitations (e.g. chevrons on the motorways that help to judge distances,
pocket calculators to assist with mental arithmetic, etc.).
In the above example, we refused to override the axioms of geometry on the account of
human error, but at the same time we acknowledged the importance of cognitive effects.
There is no contradiction there. Similarly, we should not contrast Behavioral Finance
with the need to facilitate rational behavior among people. The two go hand in hand.
Both approaches are based on healthy scepticism about the efficiency of the markets.
In Quantitative Structuring we no longer trust the markets to come up (spontaneously)
with sensible financial derivatives – we decide to build tools to help us with our cognitive
limitations.
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